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ABSTRACT 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction over 28 politically, 
culturally and linguistically disparate member states in the interpretation and 
application of EU law. Throughout its 60-year history, the Court has banned 
publication of the separate opinions of its judges and their voting records favouring 
instead brief unsigned unanimous decisions achieved by majority vote. The CJEU 
defends its practice in the interests of protecting judicial independence and its own 
authority and legitimacy. The Court’s critics call for greater transparency by 
publishing dissenting opinions along the lines of the United States Supreme Court. 
The CJEU is one of the world’s most influential courts as well as a trusted EU 
institution with everything to lose if it lost authority and legitimacy. Introducing 
dissenting opinions exposing the CJEU to the challenges of non-compliance with 
its rulings and its judges to endemic corruption would put its independence, 
authority and legitimacy at serious risk. Non-compliance and corruption have not 
been previously linked to the issue of how the Court would be affected in a new 
judicial environment of this kind. There has been no comprehensive analysis about 
how EU member state corruption, recently described as ‘breathtaking’ in scope, 
would affect the Court’s judicial independence. Equally absent is scholarly 
discourse about fragmented opinions in the context of the nascent issue of member 
state non-compliance with CJEU judgments. Until multi-disciplinary research and 
in depth analysis identify a safe path for the Court to follow free from destructive 
elements, a different route to greater transparency needs to be pursued. At the 
present time, no such research and analysis exists.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)2 has had a long-standing case 
of dissent aversion. After six decades of successfully resolving disputes and 
enforcing European community law among a growing number of EU member 
states, the Court continues to issue only unsigned institutional judgments. These 
judgments are the result of a simple majority vote presented as the collective voice 
of the Court. Minority opinions are never disclosed to the public or even recorded.  
 
Despite being part of the remarkable success of supranational adjudication in 
Europe,3 the Court appears to be at odds with its sister transnational judicial 
institutions4 and a majority of member state national courts which publish 
dissenting opinion to some extent.     
 
Although the debate about whether the CJEU should publish the separate opinions 
of its judges in the common law way has been ongoing for decades,5 it appears to 
have acquired new interest because of a recent amendment to the Treaty of the 
European Union (TEU).6 Article 13 now contains what is arguably specific citizen-
inclusive language suggesting that the interests of the people are to be served by 
                                                 
2 The European Union’s Court has had periodic name changes since its inception in 
1952, also known as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) it is now formally called 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 
3 Laurence R. Helfer, Anne Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication (1997), 107 Yale L.JU. 273. 
4 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). 
5 Julia Laffranque, Dissenting Opinion and Judicial Independence, Juridical 
International, VII (2003)162. 
6 Also known as the Lisbon Treaty. 
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the EU’s institutional framework not just the national governments of the member 
states. That the amendment may have been meant to address a transparency deficit 
at EU institutions including the CJEU has not resonated at either the Court in 
Luxembourg or at the European Parliament in Brussels.7 There is little 
acknowledgement of it except for the work of a respected academic at the 
University of Leeds in England whose writing suggests that Article 13 is meant to 
engender trust in EU institutions of which the CJEU is one of the most powerful.8 
To enhance trust, transparency is a prerequisite and dissenting opinion is offered as 
the means to achieve it.9 This linking of transparency and trust to authority and 
legitimacy arises because citizens appear to have greater faith in the ability of 
institutions to serve them if they are able to examine all aspects of them.   
                                                 
7 Interviews with Court and parliamentary officials in both Luxembourg and 
Brussels in November 5 and 6, 2013 disclosed no indication that Article 13 is 
being considered along these lines at the present time. Officials at the secretariat 
for the European Parliament Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee viewed 
the change as a “housekeeping” amendment broadening out the language but 
adding nothing new. 
8 Lyiola Solanke, The Advocate General–Assisting the CJEU of Article 13 TEU to 
Secure Trust and Democracy, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 
Vol 14 (2011-2012) Article 13: “The Union shall have an institutional framework 
which shall aim to promote its values, advance its objectives, serve its interests, 
those of its citizens and those of the member states, and ensure the consistency, 
effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions.” (emphasis added) EU 
institutions include the CJEU. 
9 Solanke, supra. Dr. Solanke presents Article 13 as a signal to the EU’s 
institutions that the interests of citizens are equal to the interests of the member 
states themselves implying that the door has been left ajar for greater transparency 
in judicial decision making at the CJEU as a key EU institution. Citing:D. 
Gambetta cited in Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘Trust, Honesty and Corruptions: 
Reflection on the State-Building Process’: www.digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/lepp 
papers/255. 
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The pursuit of institutional transparency is a central theme of those favouring 
dissenting opinion. So is the premise that judicial independence would be 
enhanced if judges were able to voice their independent thoughts publicly. In fact, 
the original premise for this thesis was that the CJEU should publish dissenting 
opinion for those reasons. However, in the course of exploring the issue, an 
unexpected and opposite conclusion emerged – the risks to CJEU independence, 
authority and legitimacy are too substantial for the Court to pursue this perceived 
route to greater transparency at this time.  
 
By following the research, it became apparent that the CJEU is a complex judicial 
institution; the only one in the world which delivers judgments binding on the 
better part of a continent of sovereign nations. Those nations are distrustful of each 
other and operate at uneven levels of democracy. What would happen to the 
independence, authority and legitimacy of the CJEU if dissenting opinion and 
public exposure to judges were introduced in its present environment is a question 
which has not been adequately explored. That ‘present environment’ includes 
widespread institutional corruption among EU member states.10  
 
Endemic corruption is the proverbial elephant in the room during discussions about 
introducing separate opinion practice at the CJEU and thereby exposing its 
judiciary to public and other pressures. The CJEU is a youthful judicial institution 
with 13 new states having joined the EU in the past decade alone.11 The member 
                                                 
10 European Union Anti-Corruption Report, (2014); Christopher Walker, The 
Perpetual Battle, Corruption in the Former Soviet Union and the New EU 
Members (2011), Centre for Public Policy, Freedom House. See also Nations in 
Transition survey 2013. 
11 The six original states: France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
The Netherlands and Luxembourg (1951), 22 other states have joined at various 
times: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (1973); Greece (1984); Spain 
and Portugal (1986); Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995); Cyprus, the Czech 
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state national courts fuel the EU law legal engine and give it authority and 
legitimacy.12 With nearly half of the member states in transition as emerging 
democracies, a change at the Court would produce unpredictable consequences.  
Part of the unpredictability is how member states would respond to minority 
opinions more favourable to their national interests. One possible outcome is the 
use of dissenting opinions to legitimize non-compliance with adverse judgments.  
 
Although dissenting opinion is at the centre of the pursuit of greater transparency 
at the CJEU, safe, viable options with predictable outcomes have not been fully 
explored either.   
 
1.1 Rationale and Scope  
 
This thesis explains why the CJEU is not ready to publish the separate opinions of 
its judiciary as proponents suggest it should. It also explores whether introducing 
dissenting opinion is even capable of resolving the perceived transparency deficit 
at the CJEU13 since the value of transparency itself has been questioned.14  
                                                                                                                                                             
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia (2004); Bulgaria and Romania (2007); Croatia (2013).    
12 Michal Bobek, “Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants: The Legitimacy of the 
Court of Justice Through the Eyes of National Courts,” in Judging Europe’s 
Judges, the Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice, edited 
by Maurice Adams, Henri de Waele, Johan Meeusen and Gert Strattmans, Hart 
Publishing, 2014. 
13 John Adler, Dissents in Courts of Last  Resort (2000) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies Vol. 20, No. 2, p.221… both U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Taft and 
Justice Brandeis regarded dissenting opinion as unacceptably weakening the 
doctrine of stare decisis, an underpinning of the common law and increasingly 
important in the civil law system. 
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While there is enthusiasm among proponents about the prospect of introducing 
separate opinions in terms of benefits, the risks of forging ahead in the absence of 
empirical research and analysis disclosing probable not possible outcomes militate 
against doing so. Before any steps toward introducing dissenting opinion practice 
can be taken, meaningful interdisciplinary research is required. This thesis does not 
provide that research. It focuses on far more modest tasks – identifying the risks 
associated with introducing a change in practice at the CJEU in its present 
circumstances and exploring where an invitation to publicly disagree might lead.  
 
While there has been extensive, comprehensive empirical research on dissenting 
opinion from many perspectives in the United States, this is not the case in 
Europe.15 Few have waded into the murky waters of consequences for the CJEU, a 
Court with a unique history, purpose and constituency.16  
 
This thesis explores in juxtaposition judicial decision making practices at two 
internationally respected institutions – the CJEU and the United States Supreme 
Court. They are Courts with different legal traditions and practices operating on 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 Alberto Alemanno, Unpacking the Principle of Openness in EU Law, 
Transparency, Participation and Democracy, European Law Review 
(forthcoming) 2014 @ p. 14 noting that the effects that transparency may have  on 
legitimacy have been little explored and dependent on the use made of disclosed 
information and by whom.(cites also D. Curtin and A.J. Meijer, Does 
Transparency Strengthen Legitimacy?) 
15 Katalin Kelemen, Dissenting Opinions in Constitutional Courts,German Law 
Journal Vol. 14 No. 98 @ 1345. The author states that while there is “an extensive 
literature in the United States regarding the use of dissenting opinion, 
comprehensive empirical research is still absent in Europe.” 
16 Some work has been done by the European Parliament through a study on 
consequential issues but not on non-compliance and corruption. 
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opposite sides of a common ocean. American common law and continental civil 
law inform the practices of each Court. 
 
Despite differences and the peculiarities of the CJEU, the American experience 
provides insight into what the European Court might expect from separate opinion 
practice if it were to embark on a similar journey.  
 
1.2 A Note on Structure 
 
Before considering the CJEU as a judicial institution and what it has at stake if it 
decided to introduce separate opinion practice in its present circumstances, the 
nature, origins and capacity of dissenting opinion requires examination. 
 
This thesis is divided into five chapters including its Introduction as Chapter 1. 
Chapter 2: “Judicial Writing” offers an overview of practices and styles; why 
divergent opinion developed deep roots in America and why unanimity became 
entrenched in continental Europe; the advantages and disadvantages of dissenting 
opinion and insights from the American experience. Chapter 3: “The Court in 
Luxembourg” places the EU and the CJEU in historical context; identifies the 
peculiarities of the Court; member state national court practices and points to the 
uncertainties inherent in a change of practice. Chapter 4: “Judicial Independence” 
discusses the challenges dissenting opinion poses for CJEU independence 
including non-compliance and corruption as well as implications for CJEU 
authority and legitimacy. Chapter 5: “Opening Pandora’s Box” offers reflections 
and options.  
 
2 JUDICIAL WRITING  
 
The communication of rights and remedies arising from judicial adjudication has 
been dominated by practices and styles rooted in history and circumstance 
throughout the democratic world. Until the mid-19th century, two judgment styles 
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dominated – ‘seriatim’ the multiple judgment practice of England and ‘per curiam’ 
the unanimous decision style of continental Europe.  
 
In its early years, the United States Supreme Court blended per curiam and 
seriatim creating a ‘hybrid’ style which is uniquely American.17 This hybrid is 
characterized by publication of a majority opinion of the Court together with any 
dissenting and concurring opinions of individual judges.18 The CJEU issues per 
curiam institutional judgments resulting from a majority vote.  
 
The American Supreme Court’s ‘hybrid’ and the CJEU’s ‘per curiam styles are 
grounded in two different legal systems – American adaptation of English common 
law; and continental civil law.19 The vast majority of the EU member states are 
                                                 
17 In a seriatim court, each judge writes an individual opinion which collectively 
comprise the judgment. This practice eliminates risk to collegiality caused by 
dissenting opinion17 since there are no proverbial feathers to ruffle. However, 
seriatim writing can be confusing since it is not always easy to discern what 
principle the court is endorsing. In a per curiam court, a unanimous, single 
unsigned majority decision is issued and published, the result of a vote among 
participating judges comprises the opinion of the court as an institution. In a hybrid 
court, individual opinions of the sitting judges’ are published as part of majority 
judgments as the overall decision of the Court.  
18 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, Minnesota Law Review 
lecture. Seriatim and per curiam are brought closer together by the middle ground 
used prominently in North America.   
19 The common law is based on statutory law and stare decisis  established by 
judicial decisions made in similar cases which over time have been compiled in 
case reports. The common law is an adversarial system in which opposing parties 
contest positions and judges adjudicate. A jury of one’s peers untrained in the law 
decides the facts cases in which trial by a jury is available and the judge determines 
the law to be applied, instructs the jury on it and any sentence. Continental civil 
law is investigative or inquisitorial in nature. In a civil system, the judges’ role is to 
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civil law jurisdictions; the most widely employed legal system in the world.20 
However there is evidence of some blurring between the lines with the common 
law and civil law systems borrowing from each other.21  
 
American separate writing is widely accepted as part of the common law decision-
making process.22 Publishing alternate judicial opinion is not a general feature of 
continental civil law. Common law judgments are detailed and expansive. Some of 
them approach literary eloquence and both majority opinions and dissents are still 
remembered if not cited many decades later. Common law judgments make 
precedent-setting law which other lower judicial institutions must understand, 
interpret and apply.  
 
The civil law judgment is brief and ‘magisterial’ because judges engage in a 
‘recitation’ of codified law. CJEU judges contribute less to shaping the law than 
                                                                                                                                                             
establish the facts of the case and apply the provisions of the relevant codified law 
In a common law system, the judge’s decision is instrumental to the shaping of law 
enacted by legislators; in the civil law system, law is shaped by the actual decisions 
of legislators and legal scholars who draft the codes that determine the law; judges 
interpret (or recite) the codified law.  
20 BrightKnowledge.org. Civil law systems evolved from Roman law which was 
used throughout the Roman Empire. Civil Law is used in most of Europe, Asia, 
South America and most of Africa.  
21 Common law separate opinions and more literary written reasons appear in the 
national courts of the EU member states; Civil law codes such as uniform 
commercial codes and labour codes are now in regular use in common law 
systems.  
22 M. T. Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of 
Dissent; (2007), Sup. Ct Rev. 283 (292-308. 
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their common law counterparts and accordingly less attention appears to be paid to 
their content and style.23  
 
CJEU judgment writing has been described as “shallow, bland and unclear.”24  
Despite this perspective, judicial brevity has its positive elements: “Writing that 
makes its point briefly is more likely to be understood than writing that is lengthy... 
                                                 
23 Guy Canivet, Premier president honoraire de la Cour de cassation francaise, 
member du Conseil constituionnel, The civil law system operates from a 
comprehensive, continuously updated set of legal codes, with procedures and 
appropriate penalties for offences clearly written and available explaining the way 
civil law courts, unlike those in common law systems, give brief reasons for 
judicial decisions. Using an example of an appellate court in the civil law system, 
the French Court of Cassation, Monsieur Canivet explains: “The parties put a 
number of questions  called grounds of appeal to the court in a very formal manner 
according to very precise rules and the court responds only to those questions…a 
cassation judgment is a collection of responses to purely legal grounds of appeal 
drawn from a decision given by a court of first instance or a court of appeal, known 
as the juge du fond The Court of Cassation does not recount the facts of the case. 
The cassation decision is not a narrative, nor does it provide a global statement of 
reasons in response to the litigation. Instead it is a series of logical replies to legal 
questions put to the court. . . When interpreting the law, the court does not have to 
give the reasoning of the legislature; it cannot substitute itself as the legislature in 
order to explain the meaning of the law in either a critical or probative manner. 
Since the law is the expression of the general will, the court cannot add to, 
transform or justify the general will. That is why, when the court interprets the law, 
it reveals its meaning by purely and simply repeating the law.  
24 Roger Alford, “Inferior Quality of ECJ Decisions” in Opinio Juris, (2007) web 
blog dedicated to reports, commentary and debate on current developments and 
scholarship in the fields of International law and politics.  
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and forces the writer to think with precision by focusing on what he or she is trying 
to say.”25 
 
Accordingly, the objectives of American and European judgment writing reflect 
the legal traditions and systems in which they operate.  
 
2.1 Deeply Rooted Practices 
 
The long era of European monarchial governance forms the underpinning for per 
curiam practice26 still well represented in CJEU judgments.27 In a per curiam court, 
a single unsigned majority decision is published, the result of a majority vote. 
Other judges on the judicial panel who may have disagreed during deliberations 
remain silent and defer to the majority opinion as required by their oath of office.  
 
Although per curiam practice was adopted at the Court’s inception largely because 
it was the practice of all six founding nations at the time, 21 member states, no 
                                                 
25 Judicial Writing Manual (1991), United States Federal Judicial Center, page 23.  
26 “The will of the sovereign” is the underpinning of per curiam style -  because the 
sovereign could have but one will, unanimous judgments were required: Rosa 
Raffaelli, Dissenting Opinions in the Supreme Courts of the Member States (2012) 
citing: S. Cassesse, Leione sulla considdetta opinione dissenziente, in Quaderni 
costituzionali,  n. 4/2009,pp. 973-986. J. Malenovsky supra. Kings could accept or 
reject findings of courts as a matter of right (eg. French Conseil d.’Etat and the UK 
Privy Council). 
27 This historical monarchial element of continental civil law was not foreign to 
England. Until 2009 when the judicial function of the British House of Lords was 
replaced with the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, the link with the 
sovereign was direct. Although appeals were heard in the House of Lords, they 
were technically heard by “the Queen-in-Parliament.” 
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doubt influenced by the Americans, now allow dissenting opinion as part of their 
majority judgments. The CJEU continues publishing its judgments in per curiam 
primarily because it produces a form of certainty as to result (which party 
prevails). It leaves room for little, if any, interpretation which would arguably 
differ among the 28 member states resulting in an uneven application of the 
Court’s rulings. 
 
In the early years of the American Supreme Court, judgments were issued seriatim 
in the English way of individual judges writing separately even when they agree.28. 
Seriatim judgments are notoriously confusing; it is often difficult to discern what 
principle the court as an institution is endorsing.29  
 
In America, Chief Justice John Marshall put an end to seriatim practice at the 
Supreme Court concluding that individual reasons posed a risk to the Court’s 
authority.30 He wanted a strong Supreme Court unlike his contemporary, President 
Thomas Jefferson. Distrustful of judicial power,31 the President believed that 
                                                 
28 Law and Custom in Early Britain, Part I.  
29 Lady Justice (Baroness) Brenda Hale (Deputy President of the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom) Judgment Writing in the Supreme Court, UKSC internet blog 
(2010). The practice at the new Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, which 
opened in 2009, issues decisions in a variety of ways, seriatim, per curiam and 
American hybrid. In its first year, the Court delivered 57 decided cases in which 20 
were “judgments of the court” in which all the justice agreed; 11 in which there 
was a single judgment with other justices agreeing, or a single majority with which 
all majority judges agreed  with separate views simply expressed as footnotes or 
observations.  
30 Chief Justice Marshall served from 1801 to 1935.  
31 David N. Mayer, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson, University 
Press of Virginia, 1994, in which Thomas Jefferson is presented as distrustful of 
the judicial power and opposing the judicial branch as final arbiter of the 
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unanimous judgments would empower the Court beyond what the founders had 
intended.32 What evolved is something in between. Now the practice of publishing 
judgments identifying the authors of majority, dissenting and concurring views is 
entrenched at the United States Supreme Court and has been adopted in courts all 
over the world to varying degrees.33  
                                                                                                                                                             
Constitution. In his mind this was not consistent with federalism. His view was not 
shared by Chief Justice John Marshall who saw the United States Supreme Court 
as “a guardian of the republic. Jefferson saw the role of the Supreme Court as 
decider of what was good for Americans as too close to playing God. CJ Marshall 
went on to decide the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison which established the 
power of judicial review of government action and effectively empowered the 
court and struck down the constitutionality of the Judiciary Act 180 during 
Jefferson’s presidency. See also references to the American legal community and 
general public skepticism about a powerful Supreme Court during Chief Justice 
John Jay’s era fuelled in part by the majority decision in Chisholm v. Georgia 
which did not favour State rights and led to the remedy of the Eleventh 
Amendment to the Constitution (as it was at that time). See also Roscoe Pound’s 
comments in The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice, 14 Am. Law 445 (1906).  
32 Henderson, supra. President Jefferson had four reasons for preferring seriatim, it: 
(i) increased transparency which led to more accountability (ii) ensured that each 
judge had considered all the issues (iii) weighed the precedential value based on 
the vote of the judges and (iv) acted as anti-precedent allowing future judges to 
correct bad law.  
33 The American hybrid developed initially at a slow pace and picked up 
momentum during Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ long tenure as an associate 
justice of the Court. He became the “great dissenter” despite his reputed dislike of 
judicial disagreement. Judges appointed during President Roosevelt’s 
administration enthusiastically issued dissenting opinions although for perhaps 
more political reasons than the “important principles” which are said to have 
inspired Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to dissent in Lochner v. New York (2005) 
198 US 45. 
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Although separate writing practice has grown exponentially since the 1940s, both 
seriatim and per curiam have retained a presence at the American Supreme Court. 
Per curiam has been described as a method of disposing of “controversial cases 
without resolving controversial issues.”34 The unanimous judgment has authority. 
President Jefferson and Chief Justice Marshall thought so in the early chapters of 
America judicial experience. However, the Supreme Court has been criticized for 
using these “nameless” judgments to do more than expressing “a narrow set of 
opinions and dispositions in which formulaic, boiler plate language leaves no 
legitimate room for individual expression” and for “hiding behind the cloak of 
invisibility.”35 This language could be associated quite legitimately with the 
judgments of the CJEU. 
 
What per curiam sacrifices in insight into the decision-making process and 
transparency, it gains in bringing “institutional strength to a controversial 
decision.”36 This use of per curiam “demonstrates the justices’ awareness that 
                                                 
34 Laura Krugman Ray, The History of the Per Curiam Opinion: Consensus and 
Individual Expression on the Supreme Court, vol. 27, issue 2, July 2002, p.187. 
Brief appearances have been noted by seriatim in the early 1970s and again in 
2000.34  Per curiam has remaining in regular use all along for limited purposes.  
35 Ira P. Robbins, Hiding Behind the Cloak of Invisibility: The Supreme Court and 
Per Curiam Opinions. Tulane Law Review, Vol. 86, (2012). The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s use of per curiam opinion in recent years indicates a relatively consistent 
pattern: In 2009, the Court recorded 19 institutional, unsigned decisions; 10 in 
2010; 13 in 2011 and 5 in 2012.  
36 Michelle Friedland, David Ham, Jeff Bleitch, Dan Ress and Aimee Feinberg, 
Opinions of the Court By Anonymous, Supreme Court Watch, (2008).  One of the 
most prominent decisions of the United States Supreme Court requiring this level 
of authority in the political and social circumstances of its day is the civil rights 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. Had consensus not been 
achieved addressing the highly divisive issue of desegregation in American 
schools, the issue might have lingered causing ongoing domestic disruption and 
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anonymity can enhance institutional credibility.”37 This is one reasons why the 
CJEU favours writing in per curiam – it delivers authoritative judgments which 
leave no room for member states to interpret and apply decisions differently. 
 
2.2 Opposing Opinions 
 
Dissenting (opposing) opinion may be the most researched and analyzed issue in 
the American judicial system second only, perhaps, to the way judges do their 
work and think about it.38  A substantial amount of empirical data has been drawn 
from the American federal appellate judiciary, in particular, the Supreme Court. 
Yet, the practice is controversial even in America.  
                                                                                                                                                             
unrest.  Other important decisions decided per curiam include: New York Times v. 
the Unites States36- an important First Amendment case about freedom of news 
agencies to publish the so-called “pentagon papers” during the Vietnam war; 
Furman v. Georgia36 in which the Court issued a four-year moratorium on capital 
punishment; United States v. Nixon36 which led to the first resignation of a sitting 
president under threat of impeachment. In contrast the Supreme Court in Bush v. 
Gore,36decided the outcome of the 2000 presidential election by a one-vote margin. 
In that case, the Court was criticized for not ‘speaking with one voice’ and in 
failing to do so, “undermined its authority’ with the outcome described as a 
political not a judicial decision. (Alan Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice: How the 
High Court Hijacked Election 2000, (2001) Oxford University Press.). See also, E. 
MacFarlane, Consensus and Unanimity at the Supreme Court of Canada, (2010), 
52 S.C.L.R. (2d) 379 at p. 380.  Per Curiam was  used by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the Quebec Referendum issue on whether the province could legally 
secede from the rest of the country.  
37 James Markham, Against Individual Signed Judicial Opinions (2006) Duke Law 
Journal Vol. 56:923 
38 In particular, Richard A. Posner How Judges Think (2008) Harvard University 
Press which discusses various theories of judicial behavior. Also Espstein, Landes  
and Posner, supra writing statistically about judicial behaviour.  
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For every word in attribution, there is another in criticism. Lauded for their 
capacity to incite thoughtful responses to the majority reasoning, dissents are also 
described as “unfortunate,” even “tragic” occurrences.39 Judges who choose to 
write separately are sometimes thought to be “out of step” with the views of the 
times.40 Yet their opinions may be vindicated as social attitudes, economic climates 
and political environments change and ultimately contribute to the development of 
the law.41 In this way, such opinions become the “voice of the future,”42 
strengthening political resolve to effect change43 by inspiring forward thinking 
                                                 
39 John Adler, Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices? Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2000) @ 221 citing Justice Brennan, 37 Hastings 
LJ 427 (1986) 427; and Lord Mansfield in Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 4 Burrows 
2303 at 2395.  
40 Mark Tushnet, I Dissent, Great Opposing Opinions in Landmark Supreme Court 
Cases, (2008) Beacon Press, Boston.  
41 Orr Larsen, supra citing: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Stare Decisis and Judicial 
Restraint, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev 281, 288 (1990) and Daniel A. Farber, The Rule 
of Law and the  Law  of  Precedents, 90 Minn. L. Rev 1173 (2005); Kevin M. 
Stack, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 Yale L.J.2235 (1996). 
See also, Andrew Lynch, Taking Delight in Being Contrary, Worried About Being 
a Loner or Simply Indifferent: How Do Judges really feel About Dissent? Federal 
Law Review Vol. 32, p. 311, (2004) in which he reviews a book by Cass R. 
Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (2003), Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press.  
42 Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, former puisne (associate) justice, Supreme Court of 
Canada, The Dissenting Opinion Voice of the Future?  No stranger to dissenting 
opinion, she described dissenting opinions as rich sources of all that is possible in 
the law; they play three roles (i) prophecy (ii) dialogue (iii) safeguard the integrity 
of the judicial decision-making process and ultimately the law.  
43 Tushnet, supra @ p. 92  
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legislators to enact progressive or corrective legislation. However, there is 
scholarly research suggesting this occurs “with minimal frequency.”44  
 
Dissenting opinion has also been described as an antidote to conformity unchecked 
by contrarian views resulting in “astonishing outcomes.”45 They can also “cancel 
the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges so 
largely depends.”46 They may also be “symptoms of dysfunction” by “exposing 
internal divisions publicly.”47  
 
Separate opinion writing on the one hand invites open disagreement on a judicial 
panel even if the opinions are framed respectfully.48 They may endanger the 
                                                 
44 Andrew Lynch, The Intelligence of A Future Day, (2005) 33 Federal Law 
Review 485. An empirical study on activity over a 22-year period (1981 to 2003) 
on the impact of dissenting opinion in the Australia’s highest court may provide 
some insight. Dissenting opinion in the High Court of Australia is focused on the 
hope that eventually the question at issue will be revisited.  The opinions 
themselves speak directly to a comprehensive justification for an alternative 
resolution by “appealing to the intelligence of a future day”. The Study concludes 
that “redemption of minority opinion occurs with minimal frequency—far less 
often than is popularly believed.” However, the study did demonstrate that 
dissenting opinion “exerts some level of influence” over the law.  
45 Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent, (2003) 1 Harvard University 
Press.  
46 Henderson supra referring to Justice Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights (1958).   
47 Henderson supra, referring to the commencement address U.S. Supreme Court 
Chief Justice John Roberts delivered to the Georgetown University Law School, 
Class of 2006, indicated he believes dissent is a “symptom of dysfunction”.  
48 Harvard, From Consensus To Collegiality: The Origins of the “Respectful” 
Dissent, supra.  
20 
 
authority, prestige49 and legitimacy of the Court or at least the decision rendered.50 
On the other hand, publishing dissents brings “clarity and authority to judgments 
and have the power to “move ordinary people.”51  
 
On a global plane, general principles of international law appear to support 
publication of dissenting opinions52 because of the substantial contribution to be 
made to transparency which permeates all institutional structures and maintains a 
prominent focus.53  
 
With all of its divided support, advantages and disadvantages, separate opinions 
have a not necessarily welcome companion – concurrences. These lead to 
fragmented judgments with pluralities (no-clear majorities). “When a concurring 
justice endorses the Court’s judgment but elects to offer an independent opinion, 
the result may be a judgment unsupported by a majority rationale.”54 
Plurality opinions most often arise in civil rights and civil liberties cases which, 
because of the human element and societal implications, are the most ‘emotionally 
                                                 
49 Prestige of the court is expressed as public confidence in some common law 
jurisdictions, Canada for example.  
50 The argument of the CJEU canvassed in the 2012 Study conducted on behalf of 
the European Parliament.  
51  Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court 2007 Term, Harvard Law Review Vol. 122:4 
(2008).  
52 Raffaelli, supra citing Malenovsky, Les opinions separees et leurs repercussions 
sur l’independence du juge international, in Anuario Colombiano de Derecho 
Constitucional, 2010, at 39 and p 31 with respect to the “growing trend”.  
53 Carlos I. Fuentes, “Transparency as a Global Goal: Towards a Unity of 
Principles in Global Administrative Law,” Research Gate (2008).  
54 Laura Krugman Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses of the Concurrence by 
the Rehnquist Court [1990] University of California, Davis Vol. 23-777 @ 811.  
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charged and uniquely revealing of the justices’ personal feelings’.55  The CJEU 
equivalent would be social issues involving values, culture and perhaps history.  
 
CJEU judges are no more immune to judicial disagreement related to personal or 
national ethos than judges of the American Supreme Court. American judges are 
protected from judicial interference in a variety of ways including life tenure. The 
equivalent protection for CJEU judges reposes in the fact that differences in their 
opinions are not disclosed. That protection would disappear if dissenting opinion 
was introduced without being replaced with something of equal strength. 
 
2.3 Lessons From America 
As the great home of the dissenting opinion, the American Supreme Court’s long 
history and experience with separate judicial writing offers insight to the CJEU.56 
Judicial dissenting opinion has had general public acceptance in America for 
generations even in decisions of national importance.57 Levels of consensus at the 
                                                 
55 Markham, supra citing the 1989 flag burning case Texas v. Johnson, (1089) 492 
US 397 in which Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring note about the personal toll 
of such an issue. Markham also notes the more recent decision of Lawrence v. 
Texas (2003), 539 UD 558 in which Scalia J. “tempered his dissent with a personal 
disclaimer: ‘Let me be clear that I have nothing against homosexuals, or any other 
group, promoting their agenda through normal democratic means.’ See also  
Pamela C. Corley, Udi Sommer, Amy Steigerwalt & Artemus Ward, Extreme 
Dissensus: Explaining Plurality Decisions on the United States Supreme Court, 
The Justice System Journal.  
56The  first ‘true dissent’ was penned in 1806: James Markham, Against Individual 
Signed Judicial Opinions (2006) Duke Law Journal Vol. 56:923 citing Paterson J’s 
dissent in , in Simms & Wise v. Slacum, (1806) 7 US (3 Cranch) 300.  
57 Recent examples include Bush v. Gore 1 148 L. Ed. 2nd 388 (2000) resolving the 
dispute between the parties in the presidential election that year; District of 
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Supreme Court have reached 50% fairly routinely58 prompting some scholars to 
conclude that America’s top judicial institution is becoming a seriatim court.59  
 
What motivates judges in courts of final review to write separately is linked to the 
choices that must be made from a platter of ‘competing yet compelling’ solutions60 
                                                                                                                                                             
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) in which the Supreme Court held that a 
citizens have a right to possess a firearm for lawful purposes, which right is 
protected by the second Amendment;  and the 2010 Affordable Health Care Act 
decision in which the Act was substantially upheld although four judges did so on 
the basis of commerce and taxation, the Chief Justice on taxation and four would 
have struck it down.  
58 A recent study tracks in percentiles dissenting practices between the 
commencement of the court of Chief Justice John Marshall (1801) and Chief 
Justice John Roberts (2005). The proclivity rates disclose that the lowest dissenting 
period of all time was during Chief Justice Marshall’s 34 years on the Supreme 
Court (1801-1835) at 4%. This was  followed by 10% on average over the next 
century until Chief Justice Stone’s era (1941-1945) at 27%;  followed by a sharp 
increase to 48% under Chief Justice Vinson (1946-1952); 50% under Chief Justice 
Warren (1953-1968; 59% under Chief Justice Burger (1969-1985); 56% under 
Chief Justice Rehnquist (1986-2005); and  47% during the two-year-period of the 
study (2005-2007)  under Chief Justice Roberts.  
59 Thomas G. Walker, Seriatim Opinions in the Oxford Companion to the United 
States Supreme Court; Henderson, supra See also Markham, supra, who notes the 
“shift from the institutional to the personal nature of opinion writing …evidence in 
Justice Breyer’s subtle and inadvertent rhetorical slip in South Central Bell v 
Alabama, (1999) 526 US 160 when he used the pronoun ‘I’ instead of ‘we’ in a 
majority opinion.   
60 Lynch, supra @ p. 320. Professor Lynch cites:  Ian Greene, Peter McCormick,  
George Szablowski, Martin Thomas, Carl Baar, Final Appeal, Decision-Making in 
Canadian Courts of Appeal (1998) in which empirical data from Canadian judges 
confirmed four such factors: the law in the context of the issues to be resolved,, the 
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and maximizing public policy preferences.61 There is also the dilemma in which a 
judge firmly believes in ‘one true answer’ and therefore must a dissent.62  
 
Whatever the motivation for the decision to write separately (a subject beyond the 
scope of this thesis and fully analyzed elsewhere)63 no one seriously advocates 
stifling the exercise of freedom of expression through contrarian views at the 
Supreme Court. However, there is a call in some quarters for the elimination of 
concurring and plurality opinions because they contribute to dissension on the 
Court.64 Others advocated restraint65 while recognizing that dissenting opinions 
often make an important contribution. However, either restricting or limiting 
dissenting opinion may undermine judges’ rights of freedom of expression just as 
much as not allowing them at all.  
                                                                                                                                                             
personal values of the judges, the procedures developed by the court in question, 
the nature of interpersonal judicial relations in the court.  
61 Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, The Choices Judges Make, Congressional Quarterly 
Press (1998).  
62 Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, California Law 
Review, Coll. 100:519, discussing different types of judicial self-restraint.  
63 Posner, supra and in various other books and publications.  
64 Linas Ledebur, Plurality Rule: Concurring Opinions and a Divided Supreme 
Court, (2009), Penn State Law Review vol. 113:3, 899 @920.  
65 Allison Orr Larsen, supra citing: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Stare Decisis and Judicial 
Restraint, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev 281, 288 (1990) and Daniel A. Farber, The Rule 
of Law and the  Law  of  Precedents, 90 Minn. L. Rev 1173 (2005); Kevin M. 
Stack, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 Yale L.J.2235 (1996). 
Also, Justice Ruth Bader-Ginsburg referring to Justice Brandeis’ comments: 
“random dissents” weaken the institutional impact of the Court and handicap it in 
the doing of its fundamental job….need to be saved for major matters if the Court 
is not to appear indecisive and quarrelsome”. . .  “his shots[were] all the harder 
because he chose his ground.”  
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The Court’s low level of consensus remains a source of uneasiness because of its 
implications for the Supreme Court’s credibility and legitimacy.66 The steady diet 
of one-vote majorities and pluralities are particularly troublesome for institutional 
legitimacy.67  
 
The Supreme Court’s plurality opinions create muddled and fragmented decisions; 
have the potential to raise more questions than they answer; and confuse the 
current state of the law.68 They have been blamed for a “divisive and weakened 
Court,69 creating uncertainty for the bench and bar. They routinely leave the lower 
                                                 
66 Chief Justice John Roberts in the New Republic interview with Jeffrey Rosen, 
2006. Although Chief Justice Roberts has expressed hopes of achieving greater 
consensus on the Court, even at 47%, the present level of dissent is not the highest 
in the Court’s history. During Chief Justice Burger’s term, the rates rose to nearly 
56% as the statistics disclose (Henderson, supra). The task of reversing the trend 
may be an uphill battle since dissent, once reserved for profound differences of 
opinion, are now routine.  
67 Bader Ginsburg, supra. Even during Justice Holmes’ tenure, dissents were 
recognized as taking a toll on institutional legitimacy.  See also Markham, supra 
discussing Justice Brandeis’ penchant for withholding separate opinions from 
publication ‘so as not to inhibit the Court’s decisiveness.’  
68 Adam S. Hochschild, The Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plurality 
Decision: Interpretation in Historical Perspective. Journal of Law & Policy [2000] 
Vol. 4:261 @ 284. From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the  
“Respectful”  Dissent; Harvard Law Review (2011)  Vol. 124: 1305@  1306. 
Hochschild, supra. John F. Davis, & William L. Reynolds, Juridicial Cripples: 
Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, (1974) Duke L.J. 59, 62.  
69 Ledebur, supra. David Paul Kuhn, Chief Political Correspondent for 
RealClearPolitics writing online: “The Polarization of the Supreme Court, 2 July 
2010:“The “supreme” authority of the high court rests on its legitimacy. The more 
absent consensus is from the high court, the more diminished its legitimacy and the 
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courts at their own devices on how the judgments should be interpreted or applied, 
if at all, and with what authority.70 The Supreme Court itself has declared a 
solution although not one which is fully effective.71 
 
Although the Supreme Court operates in a “polarized” and “politicized” 
environment, there is no question that it still commands the trust of the American 
people.72  However, the “supreme authority” of the Court rests on its legitimacy 
and scholars point out that the more consensus is absent, the more diminished is its 
legitimacy and the more each decision will come to be viewed through a “political 
lens.”73 Considering the fact that a common law court’s principal function is to set 
binding, uniform precedent, the question arises as to whether the Court is failing to 
do so when it issues a plurality opinion making it difficult if not impossible to 
discern its governing rationale.74  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
more each decision will come to be viewed through a political lens”. Kuhn also 
opines that 5-4 decisions which are routine at the Court are also those most likely 
to be overturned by later Supreme Courts.  
70.James F. Spriggs & David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, (2011) The 
Georgetown Law Journal Vol. 99:515. The authors point to the comments by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist [Remarks on the Process of Judging, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
263, 270, (1992)] and Justices Lewis Powell and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.  
71 United States v. Marks (1977) 430 U.S.188, 193.  (The holding of the Court may 
be viewed as that position taken by those judges who concurred on the narrowest 
grounds). The application of this principle has its own challenges.  
72 Gallup poll- 63% of participating Americans in 2011 disclosed that they had a 
“great deal” or “fair amount” of faith in the Court.72 It was however, the lowest 
statistical percentile on the same questions since 1976.  
73 Kuhn, supra.  Ledebur, supra.  
74 Corley, Sommer, Steigerwalt & Ward, supra.  
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Although dissents at their best improve the quality of a court’s judgments, increase 
transparency and enhance freedom of judicial expression, in the CJEU’s judicial 
environment they could be destructive.75 A track record of low consensus similar 
to the experience of the United States Supreme Court could be alarming at a Court 
which delivers binding judgments to a continent of nations.76 Nevertheless, 
dissenting opinions do demonstrate that more than one result is possible.77 They 
can give judges a wide berth of expression78 in the right case and in the right court. 
However, the ‘right court’ at the present time does not include the CJEU. 
 
3 THE COURT IN LUXEMBOURG 
 
History provides context for almost everything. The EU and the CJEU were 
created for the specific purpose of pursuing European integration in a post war era.  
 
                                                 
75 Remi van de Calseijde, “Improvement or Gilding the Lily’? – The desirability of 
Introducing Judicial Dissent at the European Court of Justice, in Vol. 1, The 
Institutional Functioning of the EU, 2010-2011, Maastricht Centre for European 
Law, Maastricht University Faculty of Law.  
76 In the case of the CJEU, rates of dissent such as recorded in the recent past at the 
U.S. Supreme Court might actually destabilize a legal system which was crafted to 
promote a collegial framework to avoid the kinds of conflict which have in  other 
eras (pre WWII) torn Europe apart.  
77 Michael Boudin,  Friendly, J., Dissenting, Duke Jaw Journal Vol. 61:881. Judge 
Friendly was a highly respected member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit and a frequent dissenter.  
78 Chief Justice Bora Laskin of Canada (1972-1984) spoke of dissenting opinion 
this way:  “A judge never writes more freely than when he writes in dissent, The 
Constitutional Character of the Judge, Israel Law Review 7 (1972):340. He also 
recorded more dissenting opinions than any Chief Justice in Canada’s history- 
Philip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law To Life (2005), The Osgoode Society for 
Canadian Legal History, University of Toronto Press: Toronto, Chapter 20.  
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Treaties have empowered the Court by making its decisions binding on all of the 
member states uniformly thereby creating a hierarchy in EU judicial adjudication 
with the CJEU at the apex. However, the Court also draws its authority and 
legitimacy from the member states individually and collectively through their 
acceptance of its judgments. Because of this, the Court is vulnerable to member 
state refusal to comply with them.  
 
3.1 A Blueprint for Peace 
 
The European Union and the CJEU owe their very existence to the devastating 
destruction of Europe caused by two world conflicts 21 years apart. Instrumental in 
their establishment were the efforts of two French political figures who understood 
the potential for a renewed cycle of war and revenge in Europe that a re-built 
Germany and an anxious France might present. They devised a plan to make war 
“not only unthinkable but materially impossible.”79 The blueprint for peace they 
devised integrated the coal and steel industries which were the primary 
commodities used for the production of war munitions at that time.80 The 
establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community by the Treaty of Paris in 
1951 was the first step towards not only integration of commodities but Europe 
                                                 
79 In addition to Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman of France, there was a 
substantial list of European leaders identified as the EU “Founding Fathers.”  
See  Franco Piodi, From the Schuman Declaration to the Birth of the ECSC: the 
Role of Jean Monnet, Archive and Documentation Centre, directorate-general for 
the Presidency European Parliament, specifically from text of the Schuman 
Declaration, 9 May 1950,  Paris.  
80 The blueprint design named the “Shuman Plan” was to place Franco-German 
production of coal and steel under a common “High Authority” (since 1961, the 
European Parliament) within the framework of an organization open to the 
participation of other European states. The handling of coal and steel production 
was meant to level the playing field shifting focus among participating nations to 
economic unification and wellbeing among the member states.  
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itself into the present European Union.81 Today there are 28 EU member states 
comprising a population in excess of 500 million. The EU is now on its way to 
becoming a new superpower.82  
 
In addition to the formation of what became the EU as a political entity, a 
mechanism was required to resolve disputes. It was predicted at the time that the 
EU Court would “eventually become the Supreme Court of a European 
Federation”83 enabled by Treaties, the rule of law and democratic principles. The 
CJEU takes claim to that legacy.   
 
3.1 No Ordinary Court 
The CJEU has been described as “no ordinary court” because of its unique 
circumstances.84 One of the Court’s more remarkable features is the fact that 28 
independent countries have relinquished some of their sovereignty to join the EU. 
By doing so, they accepted the hierarchical authority of the CJEU over their 
national supreme courts in the interpretation and scope of EU law.  Treaties link 
and legally bind these sovereign nations to each other politically, financially and 
                                                 
81 European Integration started with six original nations and has now grown to 28, 
with Croatia the most recent member state joining in July 2013. The treaty 
arrangements continued after 1951. See also Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union? 
An Introduction to European Integration, (1999), Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillanFranco Piodi, supra.  
82 T. R. Reid, The United States of Europe: The New Superpower And the End of 
American Supremacy, Penguin Group (USA) 2005. Reid is a syndicated columnist 
and investigative journalist for the Washington Post.  
83 Werner Feld, The Judges of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 
Villanova Law Review Vol. 9, p.37 (1963).  
84 Mai Sloth, The European Court of Justice: The right institution to safeguard 
legal predictability? Aarbus University, Denmark, Department of Business Law, 
(2009).  
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socially as well as to a judicial tribunal which might, and often does, issue rulings 
contrary to their individual national interests.85  
 
Because the CJEU was not created by a national constitution, it cannot be evenly 
compared to other international courts.86 Unlike the United States, the EU is 
neither a federation nor a sovereign state.87 Its members retain and exercise 
sovereignty of their own. Many come from different legal traditions and remain 
states in transition with the durability of their emerging democracies in question.88 
Although the experience of other Courts offers insight, there is little to share about 
how a change in Court practice might be received by such a diverse group of 
member states.89 Even the ICJ and ECtHR offer little insight because the decisions 
                                                 
85 The CJEU differs from other courts because of the broad reach of its decisions 
binding on all member states not just the disputing parties and the fact it belongs to 
a political community which do not exist outside the supranational environment 
See also Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create 
International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, (2005), 93 Cal. 
L. Rev.  
86 The International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights 
which are also supranational courts do not provide good comparisons either since 
they deliver judgments and rulings binding only on the parties not multiple states.  
87 Anna Bundzen, The United States Supreme Court and the European Court of 
Justice, A Comparative Study of Compliance, Orebro University, (2011). The EU 
has been described as something in between a federation and a confederation.  
88 Christopher Walker, “The Perpetual Battle – Corruption in the Former Soviet 
Union and the New European Union Members”  
89 Raffaelli, supra. Dr. Raffaelli conducted the study for the Directorate-General of 
Internal Policies, European Parliament on whether the CJEU statute should be 
amended to allow its judiciary to publish separate opinions along with majority 
judgments.  
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that make affect only the parties to the dispute, not multiple disparate sovereign 
states. 
 
Statutory support enables the Court to set its own rules of procedure. If, for 
example, the Court chose to introduce dissenting opinion, it would generate draft 
amendments to its own governing legislation for consideration by the European 
Parliament. The Court has not yet sought any such amendment.90  
 
The CJEU was originally established as an administrative tribunal. However, the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957 enlarged the Court’s role91 by giving it full adjudication 
capacity including the power to make preliminary rulings on the scope and 
meaning of European Law and hearing allegations against member states for non-
compliance with Treaty and other obligations.92 The Court’s judgments legally 
                                                 
90 Interviews conducted November 5, 6, 2013 in Luxembourg and Brussels with 
senior officials at the Office of the Registrar of the CJEU at the Secretariat of the 
European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs.  
91 Article 220, the Treaty of Rome.   
92 The Treaty of Europe (Lisbon) (2010) amended (but did not replace) the Treaty 
on the European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 
2007. It came into force two years later.  The principal Treaties from which the 
CJEU draws its authority are: The Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the 
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). See Europa.eu for a full 
outline of the basis for EU law. Treaties also  include: Brussels Treaty 1948; Paris 
Treaty 1951; Modified Brussels Treaty 1954; Rome Treaties 1957; Merger Treaty 
1965; European Council Conclusion 1975; Schengen Treaty 1985; Single 
European Act 1986; Maastricht Treaty 1992; Amsterdam Treaty 1997; Nice Treaty 
2003; Lisbon Treaty 2007 (also known as the TEU) See consolidated treaty 2010. 
The TEU and TFEU constitute the treaties on which the EU was founded.  Notable 
EU Treaties: The Treaty of Paris (1951) (the Coal and Steel Treaty – the 
foundation treaty); The Treaty of Rome (1957)  signed by the six founding Nations 
leading to the European Economic Community (1958); Maastricht Treaty (1992) 
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binding on the national courts of all member states provides uniformity of law 
throughout the EU.93 The CJEU has also bolstered its own jurisdiction by 
establishing legal concepts previously unknown in either common or civil law – 
the doctrines of “supremacy”94 and “direct effect.”95 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
formally created the EU and laid the foundation for  Eurozone (the world’s largest 
trading area); Amsterdam Treaty (1997)  defined EU citizenship and individual 
rights to justice, freedom and security and commenced reforms of the EU 
(ongoing); Treaty of Lisbon signed in 2007; ratified( 2009), in furtherance of 
Amsterdam Treaty reform out of which came the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) which organizes the functioning of the EU and 
arrangements for exercising its areas of competence.  
93 A request for a preliminary ruling is required by Article 234. National supreme 
courts are not permitted to rule on the interpretation or scope of EU law. If an issue 
arises in a national court proceeding on a question “necessary to give judgment” in 
the case, that court must request a ruling from the CJEU and once the ruling is 
made, apply it in the case before it. Requests for a preliminary ruling empower the 
CJEU to rule on the interpretation of treaties; the validity and interpretation of 
statutes and acts of the institutions of the EU.  
94 The Supremacy doctrine was established by the European Court of Justice (as it 
then was called) in response to Article 220 of the TEU, requiring the Court to 
“ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is 
observed”. This was interpreted to mean ECJ decisions take precedence over 
Member State national courts in the areas in which it has jurisdiction, most often 
resolving conflicts between State and EU law.   
95 The doctrine of Direct Effect requires member states to apply EU law 
domestically and allow individual citizens to invoke EU law against each other and 
not just the State. This has been interpreted to mean ECJ decisions take precedence 
over member state national courts in the areas in which it has jurisdiction, most 
often resolving conflicts between State and EU law. The doctrine of “supremacy” 
grants CJEU and EU law precedence over any and all conflicting member state 
legislation including both constitutional and general domestic law.   
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To be accepted into the EU sphere, new countries must demonstrate a commitment 
to the rule of law and democracy by establishing and maintaining democratic 
institutions.There is little doubt that the CJEU has become an “unusually 
influential international court.” Its work is essential for the application of the rule 
of law in Europe and helps knit the member states more tightly together.96 Unlike 
other courts, the CJEU has the authority to strike down both EC and member state 
national law which it determines to be inconsistent with EU Treaties.97  
 
Although the Court has an important role to play in the EU, the way it carries out 
its business has not engendered acceptance in all quarters because its proceedings 
and judgments are not subject to greater scrutiny. Further, the CJEU has been 
criticized for failing to achieve greater legal certainty and predictability in Treaty 
interpretation and application.98 
 
The CJEU is comprised of three separate tribunals which convene in 
Luxembourg.99 However, it is the work of the Court of Justice which produces the 
                                                 
96 Garrett, Kelemen & Schulz, supra.  
97 Karen J. Alter, Who are the “Masters of the Treaty”: European Governments 
and the European Court  of Justice, (1998) International Organizations, 52, 1, 
Winter, (998) p. 121-47. Fritz Scharpf interviewing Hans Bockler Stiftung, online.  
98 Sloth, supra. See also Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European 
Court of Justice: A Comparative Study in Judicial Policymaking, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers (1986).  
99 Robert O. Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World, 
Routledge: London (2002) fn. 68. The present CJEU comprises three courts: the 
Court of Justice (1952) the General Court (1989)and Civil Service Tribunal (2005), 
references here to the CJEU refer to the Court of Justice in its distinct capacity as 
the EU’s highest court. The largest percentage of CJEU work comes from 
mandatory referral from national courts on a ‘preliminary reference.’  The national 
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vast majority of judgments contributing to the development of EU law and the 
focus here. The judicial complement is comprised of judges nominated by each of 
the member states who are then appointed to six-year renewable terms.100 Each 
judge is required to sit as an independent member of the Court and not as a home 
state representative.101 Decisions are made by the full (plenary) court; a Grand 
Chamber of about 13 judges who hear the important preliminary references; and 
chambers of three to five judges.102 The Court structure includes the Office of the 
Advocates General. AGs are quasi-judicial officers who analyze the cases and 
present arguments as the Court’s amici.103 There are presently eight AGs serving 
                                                                                                                                                             
supreme courts have no jurisdiction to resolve an issue about EU law including 
treaty interpretation or scope. They must await and apply a CJEU ruling.  
100 With the admission of Croatia to the EU in July 2013, the Court complement 
rose to 28. Because the Court sits in an uneven number, the tradition is that one 
judge stands down, usually the most junior member of the court present.  
101 Niamh Nic Shuibhne, The Court of Justice of the European Union, (2013) 
Oxford Studies in European Law, Chapter 7.  
102 The European Court of Justice – Governance Watch website.  The full court 
hears cases of “exceptional importance” such as proceedings to dismiss the 
European Ombudsman, Member of the European Commission (the EU governing 
body), or removing a judge who is not fulfilling his/her duties. The Grand 
Chamber hears preliminary rulings on treaty interpretations and scope and direct 
actions (alleged failure of a state to fulfil obligations). Of the 544 cases completed 
between 2007 and 2011, the full court heard one case, the Grand Chamber heard 
62; Chambers courts of five judge heard 300; chambers of three heard 177 cases 
and the president of the court determine the result in four cases.102 Most of the 
decisions made by the CJEU are heard by courts comprised of five and three 
judges (87.69%). 
103 Mitchel de S.-O-l’E Lasser in Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis 
of Transparency and Legitimacy, Oxford University Press, (2004) fn 42. AGs have 
been part of the court structure since 1957 when the Court’s jurisdiction was 
expanded by the Treaty of Rome.  
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the Court. The AG role is defined using similar language in various EU treaties: 
“to present the public with complete impartiality and independence, reasoned 
conclusions on cases submitted to the court of justice with a view to assisting 
[judges] in the performance of their duties” and to function only in the “interests of 
justice.”104  
 
The AG opinion is the personal view of the lawyer writing it and is therefore 
considered to be independent. Nevertheless, these opinions are not generally 
considered to be a ‘true substitute’ for separate opinions as they are sometimes 
viewed.105 Unlike the Court’s brief and stilted writing practice, the AG opinion is 
similar to the more expansive reasoning of the American Supreme Court.106 
Although the AG opinion may be a filtering process in which opinions are 
independently given with no requirements that the judges adopt or follow them, 
they provide insight into decisions of the Court.107 They are released to the public 
in advance of the Court’s published judgment. A high percentage of AG opinions 
                                                 
104 The AG role is defined in various treaties: Euratom Treaty Article 138; 
European Economic Community Treaty, Article 166; European Coal and Steel 
Community Treaty Article 32a, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
Article 252.  
105 Raffaelli, supra.  
106 M. Rosenfeld, Comparing constitutional review by the European Court of 
Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 
Article 252, Vol 4.2006, 616-651. It is also seen as a less confrontational and more 
respectful style.  
107 Solanke supra, discussing the role of advocates general in assisting the Court by 
preparing opinions about how the issues might be resolved as a first level of 
problem solving. The role of AGs is sometimes likened to the role fulfilled by trial 
courts. The judges review the opinions along with other materials before the Court 
and are not required to rely on them although they are often important to the 
ultimate decision.  
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mirror the conclusion of the Court. With or without AG advance opinion, CJEU 
decisions are presented as majority judgments of the Court whether there has been 
true consensus or otherwise. The working language of the Court is French and 
many judgments are translated into as many as 23 different languages.108 In a 
multi-lingual and transnational environment, the production of thousands of pages 
of Court documents and judgments annually is “a necessary fact of life” at the 
Court.109 Practicalities often determine outcomes. Introducing separate opinion in 
the judgments of the CJEU has a financial implication reflected in the substantial 
cost of translation services. 
 
3.2 An Odd Phenomenon 
 
The CJEU’s practice of disallowing dissenting opinion in its judgments has been 
described as “an odd phenomenon in an era [of] visible and communicating 
governments, judicial institutions included.”110  
 
Despite the apparent lack of interest in the subject in Luxembourg, the European 
Parliament commissioned a study to assess the suitability of introducing dissenting 
                                                 
108 The official language of the Court is French. There are 23 languages use in the 
EU. While many languages are used from time to time, it is more common for 
three to five to be translated: Interviews with officials in the Office of the 
Registrar, CJEU, Luxembourg, November 5, 2013.  
109 Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston, Q.C., during European Union Committee 
hearings on the workload of the CJEU (2011), reported on line.  
110 Rasmussen, supra. Dr. Rasmussen has described the “frequent poor reasoning” 
of the Court as one of its defects which is not acceptable in an era in which the 
right to know is important in governance and governmental institutions. The 
Court’s ‘unanimous’ opinions are also question as to whether  there is true 
unanimity, a simple majority or forced consensus is a question without an answer 
given the structure and practices of the Court.  
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opinion.111 Released in November 2012, the study focused on the advantages and 
disadvantages of separate opinions and the experience of member states supreme 
courts and other international courts to some extent. Fifteen member states were 
polled on whether they would favour introducing dissenting opinion at the 
CJEU.112  A separate survey on the practice of the (then) 27 EU member states 
disclosed that seven national courts do not allow separate opinions at all; one state 
allows it only in non-constitutional cases; six allow it only in constitutional cases; 
but only 13 allow it in all cases.113  
 
The study acknowledges that transparency and openness are values favoured 
within the EU institutional structure but concludes that publishing dissenting 
opinion at the CJEU would have to be undertaken only “with restraint and with 
respect in a way that maintains collegiality of the Court.” This might be what is 
                                                 
111 Raffaelli, supra.  
112 Solanke, supra. Dr. Solanke conducted a partial poll among the member states 
which indicates that nine favoured it (Germany, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, 
UK, Ireland, Greece, Portugal; and six did not (France, Italy, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria). The division of thought falls between those 
countries which allow dissenting opinion and those who strictly follow the 
continental civil law and do not. Not surprisingly, five of the original six founding 
states were against it choosing to adhere to the favoured civil law tradition. 
Although most member states allow their Supreme Court judges to issue separate 
opinions, practices vary widely with some restricting the dissents to constitutional 
issues and others allowing it only in non-constitutional cases.  
113 Raffaelli, supra. The study includes a table disclosing this information. 
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and Austria do not 
allow it at all; Ireland allows it for (ordinary) non-constitutional cases only; Czech 
Republic, Germany, Latvia, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia allow it only in 
constitutional cases and those which allow separate opinions in all cases are: 
Bulgaria Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Cyrus, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom.  
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often referred to as the “respectful dissent.”114 It is unlikely that the practice of the 
United States Supreme Court with its one-vote margins and pluralities would be 
acceptable in either Brussels or Luxembourg.  
 
The study also expresses a cautionary note. Although including published 
dissenting opinions could enhance the Court’s “level of democratization,” it might 
also have “unforeseen consequences.” These could include unexpected responses 
from member states leading to inconsistent application of the law in the national 
courts breaking down CJEU authority and conduct which would undermine 
judicial independence.  
 
How member states would respond to fragmented judgments is unknown. The 
experience of other supranational courts, the ICJ and ECtHR, is not helpful either 
since the decisions of those courts bind only the parties to the dispute.  
 
In addition to its odd phenomenon, the Court’s writing style has been criticized for 
its want of clarity.115 One scholar suggests that by changing its single collegiate 
judgment style, the Court would be forced to rethink its written work which reads 
like “documents drafted by a committee” and are “overly abstract, vague and 
                                                 
114 Laura Krugman Ray in Justice Ginsburg and the Middle Way, Brooklyn Law 
Review Vol. 68:3 comments on the respectful dissent and : Justice Ruth Bader-
Ginsburg’s approach: [Her] opinions “consistently demonstrate respect for her 
colleagues”. Her comments criticizing them were “couched in measured language 
that expresses bewilderment rather than anger or scorn”. See also another way to 
frame a ‘respectful dissent’ penned by one of greatest of American jurists: “I regret 
sincerely that I am unable to agree with the judgment in this case, and that I think it 
my duty to express my dissent: (Lochner v. New York, (1905) 198 US 45. Justice 
Bader-Ginsburg and Justice Holmes appear to favour a more collegial approach 
than the confrontational style more recently notable.  
115 Rasmussen, supra.  
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elliptical.”116 This is weighed against the argument that the purpose of a CJEU 
judgment is to provide a definite answer to a specific legal question; not to open up 
discussions about other ways to interpret the law.117 In any event, whenever CJEU 
judgment writing arises, transparency is central to the discussion. 
 
3.3 An Uncertain Path 
 
Over the last few decades, transparency has become a democratic gold standard for 
political and public administration globally entrenched as it is in the understanding 
that it enhances trust in public institutions.118 Transparency is a measure of the 
“quality of authoritativeness of an institution, action or actor.”119 It has been 
identified as a remedy for the challenges of modern government: inefficiency, 
corruption and bad performance.120  
 
                                                 
116 Vlad Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, Virginia 
Journal of International Law Vol.49:2 (2009)  
117 Raffaelli, supra.  
118 Solanke, supra. It is a ‘self-evident’ social good. Amitai Etzioni, Is 
Transparency the Best Disinfectant? The Journal of Political Philosophy (2010), 
George Washington University.  
119 Basak Cali, Anne Koch and Nicola Bruch, The Legitimacy of the European 
Court of Human Rights: The View From The Ground, University College 
London,(2011) citing M. Weber 1978, Economy and Society 2 Vols. (trans. and 
ed. H.H. Gerth and C.W.  Mills) Oxford University Press, New York; D. Beetham. 
1993. In Defence of Legitimacy, Political Studies XLI:488-91.  
120 Jenny de Fine Licht, Daniel Naurin, Peter Esaiasson, Mikael Gilljam, Does 
Transparency Generate Legitimacy? An experimental study of procedure 
acceptance of  open-and closed-door decision making, University of Gothenburg 
Working Paper Series 2011.  
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Although transparency is valued by the CJEU, the path to achieving it is tangled 
and uncertain. Proponents of greater transparency rely on the argument that the 
Court’s present practices make the judiciary inaccessible. In addition, the Court is 
said to be at odds with member state supreme courts, the ICJ in The Hague and the 
ECtHR in Strasbourg.  Proponents point to the example of the American Supreme 
Court which achieves the ultimate in judicial transparency by publishing separate 
opinions routinely; nonplussed by one-vote majorities and pluralities. Unlike the 
Supreme Court, an institution with a single national audience well-steeped in the 
rule of law and democracy, the CJEU speaks to a motley collection of states. Many 
of those states are emerging democracies with transition issues.  
 
Although few dispute the benefits of transparency as a disincentive to bribery and 
other challenges in the general public sector, the judicial institution is a special 
case. The link between transparency and greater authority and legitimacy of the 
Court is less clear and little explored.121 At the very least, it may simply facilitate 
the functional benefit of access to information, documents and records, thereby 
providing administrative openness.122 Transparency’s link to legitimacy may be 
                                                 
121 Alemanno, supra citing D. Curtin and A.J. Meijer, Does Transparency 
Strengthen Legitimacy? A Critical Analysis of European Union Policy Documents 
(2006), SSRN.  
122 The CJEU has embraced releasing court administrative documents and records 
on the internet but it has stopped of publishing the separate opinions of its judges 
and their voting records. This protection of the Court’s authority and legitimacy is 
bolstered by Article 15 of the TFEU which exempts the CJEU and EU banking 
institutions expect “when exercising their administrative tasks.” Article13 of the 
Lisbon Treaty may add to the transparency debate because of the reference to 
rights of citizens. Whether the intention was to clarify or expand rights, 
transparency and openness are sufficiently important concepts to appear in 
multiple treaties and other documents. The European Parliament’s websites and 
those of its institutions make thousands of documents and transcripts available in 
multiple languages.  
40 
 
flawed because of “the use that citizens will make of the (now available) 
information. . .”123 If information is used for nefarious purposes such as 
influencing judicial decision-making, transparency would become a tool to chip 
away at the protective shield which isolates judges from temptations, political and 
venal influence. If this occurred, the impact on the Court’s authority and 
legitimacy would be profound. 
 
Greater transparency at the CJEU would be desirable. So would upgrades in the 
quality of the Court’s judgments which are frequently described as unclear and not 
well reasoned. On the surface, all of this seems to point to an easy remedy: Publish 
dissenting opinion like the Americans do and achieve greater clarity in judgments 
and transparency in judicial administration and proceedings.  
 
However, that remedy has an uncertain path. Introducing separate opinions at the 
CJEU would resolve one set of problems only to create new larger ones: (i) 
producing new reasons to legitimize non-compliance with judgments; (ii) 
introducing new threats to judicial independence because of endemic institutional 
corruption.124  
 
4 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
                                                 
123 Alemanno, supra: Other authors warn about the pitfalls of considering openness 
as panacea to the legitimacy problems of the EU and point out that the assumptions 
linking transparency and either output or social legitimacy are weak. (citing: T. 
Heuller, Assessing EU Strategies for Publicity (2007) 14 Journal of European 
Public Policy 563). 
124 It should be noted that transparency as a disincentive to corruption works well 
in government agencies in areas of public procurement, government contract bids 
where bribery is notoriously present. (EU Anti-Corruption Report).  
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Judicial independence is recognized the world over as a prerequisite for garnering 
trust in a judicial institution; it gives a court authority and legitimacy.125 It is the 
sine qua non of the institutional setting in which judging takes place free of threats 
and venal or ideological considerations.126 Judicial independence supplies the 
institutional matrix for democratic stability; protection of human rights and civil 
liberties.127 A judicial institution maintains trust by upholding respect for the rule 
of law and fundamental principles such as independence, impartiality and fairness 
in its proceedings.128 
 
Since inception, the CJEU has successfully shielded the work of its judiciary from 
the public domain.129 It has done so by issuing unanimous institutional judgments 
without disclosing individual judicial opinions, voting preferences and keeping no 
                                                 
125 Solanke supra, citing T. Bingham, The Rule of Law, London, Allen Lane, 2010.  
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002), adopted by the  Judicial Group 
on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, a United Nations sponsored program, during a 
meeting of Chief Justices at The Hague which acknowledge that a judge’s duty is 
to serve the community in administering justice according to the law; a duty for 
which judicial independence is fundamental.  
126 John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial 
Independence (1999) Southern California Law Review Vol. 72:353.  
127 David S. Law, Judicial Independence, The International Encyclopedia of 
Political Science, Vol. 5, pp. 1369-1272Social Science Research Network, (2010). 
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, 2002, developed through a UN 
programme, the Judicial Integrity Group, and subsequently adopted by chief 
justices globally.  
128 Solanke supra citing Bingham 
129 To avoid conflicts of interest and to protect the judicial process, the EU in its 
treaties requires the selection of judges whose independence is “beyond doubt.”129 
The CJEU’s judicial oath extracts complete secrecy about deliberations, voting 
tallies and anything that might disclose how a decision was arrived at by the 
undisclosed majority- whether it was wide or narrow.  
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records of opinions expressed during deliberations. Even the Court’s decisions are 
sufficiently opaque that individual opinions of the judges are not conclusively 
detectable.130 The judge’s themselves are sworn to secrecy during and after their 
tenure on the Court. If judges were perceived to be buckling under to threats and 
outside influence, public confidence would quickly disappear along with the 
Court’s authority and legitimacy. The EU itself would not be able to bear such an 
event. 
 
The judiciary would lose its protective shield in the CJEU’s present judicial 
environment with the introduction of dissenting opinion. That environment 
includes a Court which delivers binding judgments meant to articulate laws to be 
uniformly followed. It is a Court in which judges have only ‘renewable’ terms who 
are dependent on member state governments to reappoint them.  It is a Court in 
which judges upon completion of those terms, however long or short, return to 
their home states to continue former careers. They may face reprisals about 
decisions made that may have displeased the national government.  
 
It has been said that introducing separate opinions would allow member state 
governments to better evaluate the performance of their representative judges since 
they are not aware of judicial voting records and the positions that may have been 
taken adverse to the interests of the home state.131  
 
However, performance evaluation of any kind in a court of last resort in which 
judges have only renewable terms would spell disaster; something akin to 
                                                 
130 A designated ‘rappatour’ does the writing on behalf of all the sitting judges, or 
at least the majority which support it. 
131 Roland Vaubel, The Breakdown of the Rule of Law at the EU Level: 
Implications for the Reform of the EU Court of Justice, (2013), a political 
economist, Universitat Mannheim, Germany. Dr. Vaubel also says that judges 
should be independent.  
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positioning a mallet over their heads. It would also undermine the very things the 
CJEU and courts all over the world work hard to achieve and protect – judicial 
independence. Since the judges have limited terms, some may be tempted to decide 
a case with an eye on their own future careers by favouring the home state in a 
kind of “principal-agency” relationship. There is some credence to this if the ICJ, a 
court which allows dissent, can be considered an apt example. At the ICJ, there is 
“a remarkable trend on the part of other national judges …to publish dissenting 
opinions whenever the decision [of the majority] is against their national state.” 
This calls into question the degree of independence of judges hearing anything 
relevant to their home states.132  
 
At the ECtHR, allegations of political pressure on national judges led to a statutory 
amendment setting fixed and non-renewable judicial terms of service.  Although 
fixed terms and non-renewability is offered as a remedy, no one suggests it be 
particularly lengthy. This raises difficulties with attracting qualified candidates 
willing to interrupt a productive career for a short tour of duty in Luxembourg with 
the prospect of being frozen out afterwards. Fixing terms for judicial service is not 
the answer either unless support for lengthy appointments materializes. There is no 
evidence that long judicial careers are favoured for the CJEU by the European 
Parliament or scholars.133  
 
                                                 
132 Raffaelli, supra.  
133 Judges of the United States Supreme Court are appointed for life although many 
retire at great ages. Some countries legislate a mandatory age of retirement. For 
example, in Canada, the mandatory retirement age is 75 years for all superior court 
(federal) judges. As a basis for comparison, the ICJ has nine year fixed terms.  
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Another proposed remedy is publishing dissents and separate opinions 
anonymously.134 However, expert Court observers would have little difficulty 
identifying the author given the subject matter and even if not, public speculation 
would be equally problematic exposing judges to political influence and 
retribution. 135    
 
These kinds of issues help crystalize the reasons why the prospect of introducing 
dissenting opinion practice at the CJEU has been met with little enthusiasm. These 
matters are discussed openly with scholarly consideration. However, the two most 
troubling reasons why the CJEU should not introduce signed separate opinions are 
not openly discussed in the same way at all.  
 
Judicial influence and pressure has not been linked to the threat posed by 
institutional corruption. Risks to the Court’s authority have not been examined at 
all in terms of non-compliance with CJEU judgments when alternate opinions 
appear and are more favourable to member state interests. These two elephants in 
the room merit separate consideration. 
 
4.1 Troubled Waters 
 
When the Czech Constitutional Court figuratively thumbed its nose at the CJEU’s 
decision in Landtová by declaring the Court’s decision ultra vires, it had the 
earmarks of an “unprecedented display of judicial defiance.”136 In Landtová, the 
                                                 
134 WTO and NAFTA hearing panels addressed the issue of protecting judges from 
influence and pressure by allowing dissenting opinions to be published without 
disclosing the identity of the dissenter.  
135 Interviews conducted with officials with the CJEU Office of the Registrar and 
the Secretariat Legal Affairs Council, European Parliament November 2013.  
136 Arthur Dyeve, Domestic Judicial Non-Compliance in the European Union: A 
Political Economic Approach. 
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CJEU addressed the issue of how old age pension claims would be honoured by 
the successor states of the former Czechoslovakia.137 After the CJEU published its 
decision favouring citizen claims, the Czech national court announced it would not 
be implementing it. The national court justified its decision by stating that the 
CJEU judges simply got it all wrong.138 
 
This was the first time that an EU member state national constitutional court had 
applied the doctrine of ultra vires to declare a CJEU decision outside the Court’s 
conferred powers and therefore not applicable.139 Ultimately, the CCC’s 
“worrisome” conduct was deemed an anomaly rather than a ‘terrible blow to the 
authority of EU law.” Of interest to the prospect of introducing dissenting opinion 
at the CJEU is the CCCs contribution to the question of member state response.  
 
                                                 
137 Christian Falvey, Constitutional Court defies EU with ruling on Czech-Slovak 
pensions, Radio Prague internet posting February 15, 2012. C-399-09 (CJEU 
(2012); PL US 5/12 (CCC). A CJEU judgment applying EU regulation1408/71. 
Citizens of the Czech Republic who had worked were receiving lower pension 
rates because they had worked in the area now part of the Slovak Republic. The 
issue was brought to the CJEU by a 25-year veteran of the state-run Czechoslovak 
railways who had retired and applied for his old age pension. The Czech Republic 
reduced his pension by the 25 years he had worked in the present Slovak Republic 
part of the former Czechoslovakia. The CJEU held that the practice was 
discriminatory and required reinstatement of the full pensionable period. 
138 There are complicated issues surrounding the pension and similar questions 
arising from the dissolution of the former Czechoslovakia which are not relevant to 
the analysis here. There is no attempt here to diminish those issues. This case is 
meant to demonstrate potential member state response to adverse decisions in a 
CJEU which allows dissenting judicial opinion. 
139 Lenka Pitrová, The Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court in the Slovak 
Pensions Case and its Possible Consequences, Vol 3, No. 2 (2013) The Law 
Quarterly. Slovak Pensions Case (Pl. US 5/12). 
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If member state defiance is forthcoming when the Court issues a single-result 
decision, it is not difficult to make the quantum leap to what might occur if 
multiple alternate opinions in a single judgment are in the mix. Troubled waters 
may be in store if national courts are presented with alternate arguments to the 
adverse decision of the majority. New and unforeseen consequences may emerge 
such use of the alternate arguments to legitimize non-compliance with adverse 
CJEU rulings.   
 
The dissenting opinion appears most often in issues which strike an emotional 
chord as they do in the American civil rights and liberties cases. The CJEU 
equivalent would be national and local social issues similar to the issue in 
Landtová.  These are the kinds of cases which would inspire member states to look 
for ways to make an adverse ruling inapplicable to themselves as Landtová 
demonstrates. 
 
The member state national courts are the primary source of CJEU authority and 
legitimacy. The Court’s judgments must be accepted by the member states and the 
CJEU’s authority recognized.140 Member state support of CJEU judgments is also 
critical to the operations of the EU law legal regime itself. The failure of member 
state national courts to comply with CJEU judgments would impair the 
effectiveness of EU law; the more severe and the longer the duration; the greater 
the erosion.141 Neither the EU nor the CJEU have capacity (budget or bureaucracy) 
to enforce compliance with Courts judgments directly. They must rely on the 
member states and their national courts to fulfil their obligations.  
                                                 
140 Bundzen, supra citing: Anthony Arnull I “The European Union and its Court of 
Justice, Oxford University Press (1999) @84: “only loyal acceptance will ensure 
that it (EU) achieves its intended objective.”  
141 Diana Panke, Why The ECJ Restores Compliance Faster in Some Cases Than in 
Others, (2007), Freie Universitat Berlin. Berlin Working Paper on European 
Integration No. 4. 
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Although historically high levels of compliance have been recorded, there are 
strong indications that this does not necessarily mean the national courts have fully 
accepted the Court’s decisions. At the same time there is little known about 
whether national courts are actually satisfied with CJEU rulings or accept them as 
authoritative. Interpreting silence as compliance is only assumed.142 
 
In the early years of the EU, some countries took the position they would comply 
with Court rulings as long as they were not in conflict with their own national 
laws. This position changed over time as the Court evolved. While some states 
avoid collisions with the European Commission (EU governing body) and the 
CJEU by grumbling but complying with the Court’s rulings, others must be forced 
to do so. The United Kingdom and Germany, for example, have had outstanding 
compliance issues for as long as 15 and 14 years, respectively.143 
 
The reasons why member states fail to comply is as complex as the domestic 
judicial politics demonstrated in Landtová and as simple as state cost-benefit 
analyses and low political capacities.144 Non-compliance is demonstrated by 
unilateral evasion, a push for secondary legislation, or a rallying cry among other 
EU Member States for Treaty revision.145 Whatever the reason might be for 
                                                 
142 Bobek, supra. 
143 Panke, supra. 
144 Tanja A. Borzel, Tobias Hofmann, Diana Panke, Who’s Afraid of the ECJ?  
Members States, Court Referrals, and (Non-) Compliance (2005) prepared for the 
ECPR Joint Sessions, Granada, April 14-19, 2005. 
145 Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Heiner Schulz, The European Court 
of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union 
(1998), The International Organization Foundation. This issue is not unique to the 
CJEU, the United Supreme Court has grappled with lower court non-compliance as 
well. See Robert McKeever, The United States Supreme Court: A Political and 
48 
 
member state non-compliance with Court rulings, the Commission must decide 
how it will react.146 If the Commission decides to proceed, the first step is 
infringement proceedings through dialogue with the non-complying state.147 If the 
Commission is unable to extract compliance, it may refer the case to the CJEU. 
The Court’s work begins with an adjudication phase and hearings followed by a 
judgment. If non-compliance continues, the Court conducts enforcement 
proceedings148 out of which substantial financial penalties may be levied. Because 
member states often waited until the 11th hour to fulfill their obligations, lump sum 
sanctions are now permitted covering all stages not just the conclusion of the 
proceedings.149 This was intended to financially curb the propensity for last minute 
only response. While the “vast majority” of states are presently compliant, there 
appears to be evidence of a possible trend towards non-compliance in the Court’s 
present judicial environment.150 
                                                                                                                                                             
Legal Analysis, Manchester University Press, 1997, Chapter 6: The power of the 
Supreme Court: constraints, compliance and impact. p.148. “the pattern on non-
compliance varies with the issue”.  
146 Heather A.D. Mbaye, Assessing Competing Explanations for Compliance and 
Non-Compliance and European Union Policies, Mid South Political Science 
Review (2009) Vol. 10. 63.  
147  Article 258, TEU.  
148 Article 260 TEU.  
149 Article 228 TEU. Applications to sanction the member state for non-compliance 
include: a daily penalty from date of delivery of the judgment and a lump sum 
penalizing the continuation of the infringement between the date of the judgment 
confirming non-compliance and the date of the enforcement judgment.  
150 Borzel Hofmann, Panke supra, citing Maria Mendrinou, Non-Compliance and 
the European Commission’s Role in Integration, (1996), Journal of European 
Public Policy 3 (1):1-22;  Jonas Tallberg, Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, 
Management, and the European Union, International Organization,56,3,609-43, 
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Member state national courts expect CJEU decisions to contain “defensible and 
practical judicial reasons, clearly discernible, free of contradictions and reversals 
which can be implemented at the national level.”151 How member states would 
respond to something less than a decisive result from the CJEU in terms of 
compliance is unknown. 
 
There are many questions about new and unforeseen consequences which need to 
be explored before an informed decision could be made about introducing 
dissenting opinion at the CJEU.  In the last decade alone, the list of EU member 
states has nearly doubled. These new entrants arrived with “rather strong ideas and 
often a strong set of historical grievances.”152 Choosing non-compliance with 
adverse decisions of the CJEU on the basis of a preference for a minority opinion 
that suits them better would not be off limits.  
 
The prospect of non-compliance threatening the Court’s authority is not the only 
major issue hovering in the background in the debate about introducing dissenting 
opinion at the CJEU. The other elephant in the room, institutional corruption poses 
a potential full frontal attack on judicial independence.153  
 
4.2 Breathtaking Corruption  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2002); Talberg and Christer Jonsson, Compliance Bargaining in the European 
Union, in ECSA International Conference, Madison, Wisconsin (2001).  
151 Bobek, supra 
152 Melanie Feakins and Luiza Bialasiewicz, Trouble in the East”: The New 
Entrants and Challenges to the European Ideal, Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, 2006, 47, No. 6, pp. 647-661. 
153 Christopher Walker, The Perpetual Battle, Corruption in the Former Soviet 
Union and the New EU Members (2011), Centre for Public Policy, Freedom 
House, Nations in Transition. 
50 
 
BBC News Europe carried an eye popping headline on its internet news service on 
February 3, 2014: “Corruption Across EU ‘breathtaking.’154 The news report 
quoted from a comprehensive report released to the European Commission and 
Parliament that same day.155 The Report covered all 28 member states and assessed 
the extent of corruption and its toll on the EU economy and society. A pervasive 
problem was identified across the entire EU with some states far more affected 
than others. Bribery in government procurement is one of the most rooted problem 
areas.156 
 
Membership in the EU does not mean that all states are at the same level of 
development politically, socially or juridically. Some of the new EU member states 
are “struggling to meet high democratic standards of transparency and probity 
while saddled with incompletely reformed institutions”. There is also influence 
from neighboring authoritarian states as noted here: “The notion that the EU border 
will function passively as a sort of firewall against the corrosive influence of these 
                                                 
154 EU Home Affairs Commissioner, Cecilia Malmstroem. 
155 EU Anti-Corruption Report of the EU Home Affairs Commissioner to the EU 
Council and the European Parliament (3 February 2014). Data align with two 
major opinion polls by Eurobarometer, the Commission’s polling service on 
perceptions of corruption and experience with corruption. The study concludes that 
corruption has been described as ‘an obstacle to doing business in Europe.’ Bribery 
is identified as a pervasive problem and appears in all levels of public 
procurement; political party financing. Bulgaria, Romania and Italy were identified 
as ‘hotspots for organised crime gangs in the EU’. There are about 3,000 such 
gangs in the EU according to EU police agency Europol. White-collar crimes like 
bribery and sales tax fraud ‘plague many EU countries.’  
156 Counties most affected: Croatia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Bulgaria, 
Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Greece; the country least affected: 
Sweden. 
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[autocratic] regimes is a dangerous illusion.”157 As a result, the durability of the 
new found commitment by emerging EU democracies to the rule of law and 
democratic principles remains in question. 
  
The organization, Nations in Transition, which establishes annual scores for new 
democracies, identifies corruption as: Bribery, graft, conflicts of interest, influence 
pedaling, dubious legal decisions and a wide range of allegations of corruption 
against senior government officials.158 Among the EU states, Bulgaria has been 
singled out as a country with one of the most corrupt legal systems in the world 
and Romania has similar challenges.159Slovakia and Estonia had downgraded 
democracy scores to reflect ‘backsliding’ in solidifying their democratic 
institutions since joining the EU. The Czech Republic improved its score on 
‘judicial framework and independence’ through an increase in anti-corruption 
activity in the prosecutor’s office. Despite problems in other categories, Hungary 
improved its ‘judicial framework and independence’ score by issuing judicial 
decisions ridding the country of bad laws.  
 
Efforts towards remedies vary among the EU states since judicial institutions in 
previous authoritarian regimes were appendages of government. Long serving 
                                                 
157 Walker, supra citing Nations in Transit 2013 which paints a disturbing portrait 
of democratic development in Central Europe and Eurasia over the past year. 
Democracy scores are based on seven rating categories: Civil society, 
Independence of the Media, National Democratic Governance, Local Democratic 
Governance, Judicial Framework, and Independence and Corruption. The 
democracy scores for former autocratic states which are now part of the EU show 
that seven EU member states experienced declines: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, all former Warsaw Pact member states. 
158 Walker supra.  EU Anti-Corruption Report, supra. 
159 Stephanie A. Littlehale, A Study of Corruption in the Bulgarian Legal System 
(2012) Honors College 66. 
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judges in the national courts may “retain old habits of venality, equivocation or 
deference to the political establishment may contribute to the phenomenon” [of 
corruption].  
 
However, “there is reason to hope that a younger generation of jurists may prove 
more effective.”160 Nevertheless, it may take a long time before that new juristic 
influence talks hold sufficiently to counteract the historical pattern. 
 
The challenge of corruption is not restricted to new entrants to the EU member 
state family. In Italy, one of the EU founding member states, legal measures had to 
be instituted to aid autonomy and independence of the judiciary.  
 
Until the Italian prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, was stripped of his 
parliamentary seat after he was convicted of criminal charges including abuse of 
office, in June 2013, efforts to isolate the judiciary from political influence had 
been unsuccessful. As noted at the time “the campaign run by Berlusconi against 
the judiciary seriously undermined public confidence in the judiciary.161 
 
This snapshot of corruption among EU member states raises issues about how a 
move by the CJEU away from the present high level of protection of judicial 
independence would play out. Introducing dissenting opinion identifies judges and 
exposes them to threats and pressures through unscrupulous or nefarious activities. 
This challenge compounds the problem earlier identified – the prospect of judges 
looking over their shoulders when term renewal time arrives.  
 
                                                 
160 Walker supra @ p. 13. 
161 John Adenitire, Judicial Independence in Europe, the Swedish, Italian and 
German Perspectives. (2012) University College London, Constitution Unit. 
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The potential for pressure from national governments on “their” judge and from 
national public opinion is substantial.162 The effect on the Court’s authority in the 
event the public perception of its judiciary became associated with susceptibility to 
external pressure would be profound. Its authority would most certainly be 
diminished if not obliterated. 
 
It is not difficult to imagine that both old and new members would act in 
unpredictable ways to a change in judgment practice at the CJEU. With corruption 
so endemic among many EU member states, it is more than likely that responses to 
a change of judicial practice would expose CJEU judges to threats, influence and 
political whim.  
 
4.3 Risking Authority   
It should be clear at this point that introducing separate writing practice at the 
CJEU and publishing judicial voting records would amount to risk taking of the 
highest order. 
 
As the impartial interpreter of EU Law, the CJEU requires solid authority.163 
Although respect for the Court is strong throughout the EU at the present time, 
there is also a perception that the CJEU has become remarkably powerful as a 
result of its own development of previously unknown legal doctrines such as 
supremacy and direct effect. This scooping up of power is viewed by some 
member states as a chipping away of their sovereignty.164 There is a desire to 
                                                 
162 Remi van de Calseijde,  supra. 
163 Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz, supra.  
164Messerschmidt, supra.  
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constrain what some member states regard as the Court’s expansive lawmaking.165 
One way to constrain the expanding power of the Court would be to introduce 
dissenting opinion thereby effectively weakening judicial decisions and 
neutralizing the power of the Court. It would have the added effect of slowing the 
pace of what is perceived to be the Court’s relentless march towards EU 
integration at the expense of member state interests. A desire to slow the pace of 
integration by weakening the Court’s power may have more currency than other 
reasons for introducing dissenting opinion such as achieving greater 
transparency.166 
 
Morten Messerschmidt,167 a member of the European Parliament (Denmark) and 
Vice Chair of its Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, has called for 
adoption of separate opinion practice at the CJEU for that very reason. He 
suggests, as others have, that the practice should follow “along the lines of the 
United States Supreme Court.” The MEP’s interest in introducing dissenting 
opinion has a political focus — containing the power and authority of the Court to 
slow the pace of European integration in the interests of member state sovereignty. 
                                                 
165 Anthony Arnull, Me and My Shadow: The European  Court of Justice and the 
Disintegration of European Union Law, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol 
31, Issue 5 (2007). Alter, supra.  The CJEU unlike other courts can strike down 
both EC law and national law which is inconsistent with treaty obligations and it 
boldly rules against the interest of the member states.  
166 Except for academic commentary, attitudes toward separate opinion writing 
depend on whether one views the role of the Court as a strong proponent of the EU 
and its integration objective against a desire to slowing the pace of integration 
achievable by weakening its judgments through introducing separate opinions.  
167 Messerschmidt has made the case for dissenting opinion practices and 
disclosing voting patterns of judges in a book published in his native Danish. He 
also expressed his views about dissenting opinion’s potential contribution to the 
CJEU during an interview at his parliamentary office in Brussels on November 4, 
2013.  
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Pointing out that the EU is not a country and that member states have no common 
ethos, he sees dissenting opinion as a tool for limiting CJEU authority and reach. It 
is also his view that the CJEU favours integration over member state sovereignty 
and by doing so demonstrates a political bias. He is not alone in his take on the 
Court’s integration pace. It has been suggested that the CJEU should ‘soften’ its 
pro integration stance.168 
 
Efforts to constrain integration by weakening the Court’s authority and legitimacy 
may only have the effect of inciting the Court to cater to the demands of member 
states.169 The political elements of the debate are well beyond the scope of this 
thesis but are relevant for at least the purpose of demonstrating that separate 
opinions are perceived as weaker judgments. 
 
Unanimous opinions have been recognized as more powerful because they bring 
authority to the judgment. For that reason, President Jefferson favoured the 
seriatim style of England – to make the Court the weak institution he believed the 
founders had intended. Chief Justice Marshall discouraged divergent opinion 
because he wanted to build a strong Court. Today, the United States Supreme 
Court relies on unanimous unsigned per curiam institutional judgments when it 
wishes to convey a definitive and strong statement to the American people and to 
bring “institutional strength to a controversial decision.”170 
 
Proponents of dissenting opinion at the CJEU argue that great strides in 
transparency and clarity of the Court’s processes and judgments “might, could or 
                                                 
168 Henri de Waele, The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Integration 
Process: A Contemporary and Normative Assessment, [2010] Hanse Law Review 
Vo.. 6, No. 1. Suggested that the CJEU ought to ‘soften’ its pro-integration stance.  
169 Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz, supra 
170 Friedland, Ham, J Bleitch, Ress and Feinberg, supra. Brown v. Board of 
Education, supra. 
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should” be achieved.171 This language of uncertainty frequently appears in 
academic literature discussing the potential advantages of dissenting opinion at the 
CJEU; yet nothing can be clear about uncertainty. Those same proponents are not 
discussing the full implications of dissenting opinion either. 
 
By having disallowed separate opinions all along, the CJEU may have been quietly 
protecting its own authority and legitimacy. Among the Court’s stated reasons for 
keeping dissenting opinion and the voting records of judges private is that very 
thing – risks to the Court’s authority and legitimacy and exposing the CJEU 
judiciary to public influence and political pressure. Insight into how that might 
play out is already nearby.  
 
If multiple opinions in a single judgment are presented to member state national 
courts, some may adopt the Czech Republic’s brazen approach in Landtová and 
challenge the CJEU’s decision despite their lower positions in the EU judicial 
hierarchy. Refusing to comply with a CJEU judgment on the premise that the 
dissenting judge(s) got it right and the majority got it all wrong would be a direct 
strike at the heart of the Court’s authority. Risk to its authority is not something the 
CJEU has invited at any time throughout its history. 
 
5 OPENING PANDORA’S BOX 
 
The CJEU is one of the world’s most influential courts as well as a trusted EU 
institution with everything to lose if its authority and legitimacy were undermined.  
Introducing dissenting opinion with its one-vote margins and pluralities in the 
Court’s present judicial environment has potentially insurmountable risks. The 
                                                 
171 Justice Mary Arden (member of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, The 
Sir Thomas More Lecture, Lincoln’s Inn, 10 November 2009 Peaceful or 
Problematic? The Relationship Between National Supreme Courts and 
Supranational Courts in Europe. 
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result could be a Pandora’s Box of unwanted contents which once opened cannot 
be closed.  
 
It has been demonstrated in the foregoing analysis that fragmented judgments at 
the CJEU would be interpreted by member states in any way that advanced their 
own interests through legitimizing noncompliance with Court rulings. With 
judicial voting records publicly exposed, there is a high probability that member 
states would engage in unprincipled behaviours which would threaten judicial 
independence and the Court’s authority and legitimacy. It may take generations for 
the EU member states to come to grips with the level of institutional corruption 
recently identified. It may take the emerging democracies just as much time to 
settle into a new state of being where the rule of law prevails absent historical 
grievances and other distractions. 
 
Publishing separate opinions and judicial voting records appears to be the only 
option seriously considered so far in the push for greater transparency at the CJEU. 
Rather than putting its authority and legitimacy at risk, another direction could be 
followed. The Court could revise its present practices to illicit greater transparency 
drawing from the best of the common and civil law traditions in two important 
areas: (i) oral hearings and (ii) written judgments.  
 
The oral hearing is an under-utilized feature of the Court and is governed by its 
own Rules of Procedure.172 Hearings could be publicized and expanded well 
beyond the current abbreviated process lasting scant minutes with little general 
public awareness that they are even taking place. Allowing the kind of judge-
                                                 
172 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Chapter III, Article 55 “Oral 
Procedure”. “The President [of the Court] may in the course of the hearing put 
questions to the agents, advisers or lawyers of the parties. The other Judges and the 
Advocate General may do likewise.” 
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lawyer discussion, banter and debate familiar in common law appellate courts 
would go a long way toward fleshing out all aspects of the case. Lawyers, litigants 
and citizens generally would see and hear for themselves what the Court 
considered in arriving at its decision thereby going a long distance towards greater 
transparency. Doing so would also provide a window into the decision-making 
process which citizens could come to understand and trust as they listen to the 
discussion of the issues relevant to their case. Even if their legal point did not win 
the day, they would at least come to understand that it was considered and 
understood.173  
 
The CJEU has been criticized for delivering shallow, bland and unclear judgments 
which lack transparency. The Court could enhance its judgments through quality-
control and refraining from “one-sided systematic and teleological reasoning” and 
“making a visible attempt at more balanced interpreting.”174 Informing and 
educating litigants and EU citizens in plain language about what its decisions mean 
for them would contribute greatly to transparency and respect for the process. 
Writing more expansively in a clear and compelling fashion similar to the Court’s 
Advocates General opinion style would be an option as well. Although more 
expansive judgment writing would command greater resources for translation 
services, the cost would be modest compared to the prospect of publishing the 
many potential separate opinions of its judiciary.  
 
In summary, the CJEU’s juristic umbrella provides a canopy for member states 
from both common law and civil law traditions. There is blurring of the lines 
between the traditions already. It would not be too great an exercise for the Court 
to draw more from the common law tradition by expanding its oral public hearings 
                                                 
173 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, (ret’d), The Majesty of the Law: Reflections of a 
Supreme Court Justice (2002): Random House.  
174 De Waele, supra 
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into something more meaningful and to produce better written decisions for a 
wider audience in a more expansive, informative and educational way. 
 
Changes along these lines would create a refreshing new profile for the CJEU and 
give meaning to the EU’s legislative commitment to maximizing transparency for 
its citizens without placing the Court’s own authority at risk.  
 
~ 
